2nd Sino-American War
The US Army has not accepted the simple fact that its performance in the Korean War was lousy. This year I’ve endeavored to understand America at war. After the World Wars, where America was Johnny-come-lately with industrial-might-makes-right, Korea represents the first modern war, where American goals are muddled, local allies are weak, but airpower is dominant. The war in Korea could be the first chapter in a textbook on American military foreign policy about how the combination of paranoia, ignorance, and intolerance of casualties leads to irrational action.
After the Japanese withdrew and and joint American/Soviet trusteeship, the lack of any ability to come to an agreement led to generals deciding on their own the clean line of the 38th parallel. When North Korea decided to invade, the MacArthur rushed in thinking it was fighting Soviet communism, when it fact was fighting against a Chinese force fighting to maintain a sphere of influence. Throughout the war, American airpower was dominant, its infantry was unreliable, and its intelligence practically non-existent. MacArther gambled and won by invading Incheon, but then rashly provoked the Chinese into the conflict and exuberantly pursued a policy that almost certainly would have led to World War 3.
The Chinese performance was little better. They suffered mass casualties, and through pushing south led to a reinvigorated and opposition from the American establishment. Their experience fighting against American interests in the form of the KMT was insufficient preparation for dealing with extended supply lines and unrestricted airpower. In the end, no armistice was signed, foreign powers simply agreed to stop active fighting. The battle lines ended mainly where they started, only causing death, suffering, and a particularly bleak epilogue (see: Nothing to Envy) for the North.
** 20th book of 2023 **