**Failed Gambits to Suicide **

  • Whatever the prowess of the Wermacht, the nation lacked the means to win. *

This was the conclusion reached by German central staff in December 1941 almost 4 years before V-E day. * For the rest of the war, those responsible for knowledge and planning fulfilled their roles in the knowledge that strategic success was unattainable. *

It’s easy to look at WW2 with hindsight bias and wonder at the rationality of the Japanese attacking America or the Germans attacking Russia. Why provoke a power with potentially superior force? But from the perspective of both Nazi and Imperial Japanese strategists, war was inevitable. They were caught in a Thucydides trap of facing rising powers with superior production capacity and a short window of time where their own militaries would be superior. In both cases, Axis intelligence underestimated Allied military capability. And in both cases this underestimation was apparent relatively early on in the war.

Neither system was able to adjust to reality after it was apparent. For Germany after being unable to reach Moscow, for Japan after Midway. Rather than pursue an armistice with the US or Russia, both fronts led to annihilation of the ruling governments, and the deaths of millions, even after the die had been cast. In many ways, the levers of mass media, industry, and government made war and escalation a one way path; it was only the advent of nuclear weapons and superpowers that put a lid on the escalation of mechanized war.

The allies were not immune to this, pursuing objectives with questionable strategic. For example, *The New Guinea campaign, like so many in the war gained a momentum and logic of its own. * Other American efforts such as the b-29 program or Africa campaign had a similar level of silliness.

** A Verdict on Tactics **

To cover the entirety of WW2 in one book, Max Hastings mercifully relies on pithy verdicts of tactics and results. Surprising to me was how completely American achieved naval superiority and its impact: * Nimitz’ submarines were inflicting attrition on Japan’s merchant fleet at a rate unsustainable for a nation of imports. * Or how unlike modern limited warfare, * The impact of guerila warfare was small in eastern Europe * in the face of total war and brutal opponents.

** Style **

Another highlight is Hastings’ reliance on firsthand accounts from the front lines. This helps bring home the tragedy of, and personalize the mass destruction happening across the globe. This is most effective when he adopts short vignettes of the slain, telling you about a person in harrowing circumstances from their own POV only to reveal that they died a few days later. Perhaps my only critque is that Hastings takes a rather monolithic view of the Axis powers, burying internal dynamics when those drove axis decisions as much as the internal strife of the Allies. I’m surprised to find myself recommending the Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Overall a worthwhile read.